What Goals Should You Have?

Last time, I ended with the question, "What goals should we have?". Before, I said that "should" only makes sense in reference to goals, so how can this question be answered?

Obviously, using a goal to justify itself is circular reasoning. But you could justify a goal using other goals. If a goal helps you achieve your other goals, you should have it, in the same way you should do anything else that furthers your goals. Conversely, if a goal hinders your other goals, you shouldn't have it, in the same way you shouldn't do anything else that hinders your goals.

But then, what about the other goals? How do you determine whether or not you should have them? In the same way, referring to each other. This will form an infinite regress of self-reference, but that's not necessarily insurmountable. It could probably be represented similarly to Google's PageRank algorithm, which determines the importance of a website based on the number and importance of websites that link to it.

But doesn't that end up being just as circular as before? Well... Yes. And given two or more sets of goals which support each other equally well, and the unlimited ability to modify your goals, I don't know how you could determine which set of goals you "should" adopt. For that matter, I don't know what "should" means in that context.

But as it happens, I don't think we do have the unlimited ability to modify our goals. I think our goals are at least partially constrained by our biological nature. We need to eat. You can deliberately refrain from doing so, but I think that's more acting on a conflicting goal rather than not having the goal to eat.

And if that is the case, then the goals you can't change give you a starting point to base the goals you can change around.

The Fundamental Question of Morality

The more I think about my last post, the more I think that "What should we do?" is the most fundamental question of morality. Should you kill one person to save five? Should you ever lie under any circumstance? It seems all moral dilemmas boil down to questions of action and decision.

But this alone doesn't really clarify matters much. It just pushes the ambiguity onto the word "should". What does it mean to say that you "should" do something?

Well, I came up with a partial answer here. As far as I can tell, for a "should" question to make sense, a goal is required. And I think in practice, whenever you make a decision, you do so for reasons, which can be described as goals.

But morality isn't just about how to achieve your goals. I think most people would say it's immoral for a sociopath to kill, even if that's his goal. In fact, I think most people would say it's immoral for someone to have such a goal.

So, maybe the most fundamental question of morality isn't "What should we do?" but rather, "What goals should we have?". But I just said "should" requires goals. How can you say what goals you should have without referring to goals? Is it even possible? If not, how can you answer the question?

Hypothetical Imperatives

In my last few posts about morality, I've been pretty confident about my conclusions. From here on out, it will start getting more speculative. Some of my ideas may have merit, some may not. Please, tell me what you think about what I got right, and what should be changed.

In my last post, I asked how you could derive "ought" from "is". For a certain type of "ought" that's not hard at all. That type of "ought" that is a course of action to accomplish a given goal. For example, if  your goal is to lose weight, you ought to eat less fat. It is possible to empirically observe and test that to see if it effectively achieves the goal. This type of "ought" is called a hypothetical imperative and it's existence is the logical consequence of the existence of goals.

But is that the type of "ought" we're interested in? If we're talking about morality, shouldn't we be talking about something that's objective, and independent of individual goals?

One way of being independent of individual goals is to relate to all goals. If there were such a course of action, you would clearly want to follow it, because it would be a way to achieve your goals, regardless of what your goals are. But it's clear that there is no course of action to accomplish any goal. No matter what course of action you propose, you can come up with a goal counter to it. For example. you can't say that you should never steal to accomplish any goal, because that doesn't effectively achieve the goal of stealing.

Another way of being independent of individual goals is to not relate to goals at all. But in that case, why should you follow such a course of action? That approach seems to fall headlong back into the problem we're trying to answer. There's no apparent way to derive such an "ought" from an "is".

So are we back where we started? Unable to connect morality to reality? Well, not necessarily. We failed to find a special kind of "ought" that in independent on individual goals. But we did find the hypothetical imperative, which is a kind of "ought". Maybe it's the only "ought" we need. Maybe morality can be built entirely out of hypothetical imperatives. Again the question remains: How?