Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

There have been a lot of stories recently about police abuses of power. Undoubtedly, these stories are not representative. The vast majority of police-civilian interactions do not end with death or violence. Most cops are good cops.

But that doesn't matter, when the whole system is bad.

When a police officer can kill someone with no provocation, on camera, and get away with it, it doesn't matter that there are more good cops than bad cops, because the good cops are part of a system that does nothing to stop the bad cops.

And it's not just the major abuses like that. I've heard (not being a cop, I don't know for sure) that police officers will usually not give other officers tickets for traffic violations. Of course, that's a very minor thing, but it's indicative of the problem. Police officers are held to a lower standard of conduct than civilians.

"With great power comes great responsibility." Unless you're a cop.

Folk Morality

Folk science is pre-scientific ideas about how the world works. For example, a common idea in folk physics is that an object in motion requires a constant force to stay in motion, and if the force stops being applied, the object will soon come to a halt.

Now, folk science is not always wrong. It actually tends to be very good at predicting what happens in everyday circumstances. If you're pushing a cart, the carts stops moving when you stop pushing. It's when you leave everyday circumstances that folk science fails.

I think the same idea applies to morality. Folk morality is what people generally use when making moral decisions. It doesn't have any kind of rigor or theory behind it, but in everyday circumstances, it works alright. Don't lie, don't steal, don't kill.

The biggest problem with this idea is that folk science is based on things that can be directly observed. Folk morality doesn't seem to be. As a result, it's much more prone to differ between cultures and eras. For example, two hundred years ago, slavery was common and accepted, but it isn't today.

What Goals Should You Have?

Last time, I ended with the question, "What goals should we have?". Before, I said that "should" only makes sense in reference to goals, so how can this question be answered?

Obviously, using a goal to justify itself is circular reasoning. But you could justify a goal using other goals. If a goal helps you achieve your other goals, you should have it, in the same way you should do anything else that furthers your goals. Conversely, if a goal hinders your other goals, you shouldn't have it, in the same way you shouldn't do anything else that hinders your goals.

But then, what about the other goals? How do you determine whether or not you should have them? In the same way, referring to each other. This will form an infinite regress of self-reference, but that's not necessarily insurmountable. It could probably be represented similarly to Google's PageRank algorithm, which determines the importance of a website based on the number and importance of websites that link to it.

But doesn't that end up being just as circular as before? Well... Yes. And given two or more sets of goals which support each other equally well, and the unlimited ability to modify your goals, I don't know how you could determine which set of goals you "should" adopt. For that matter, I don't know what "should" means in that context.

But as it happens, I don't think we do have the unlimited ability to modify our goals. I think our goals are at least partially constrained by our biological nature. We need to eat. You can deliberately refrain from doing so, but I think that's more acting on a conflicting goal rather than not having the goal to eat.

And if that is the case, then the goals you can't change give you a starting point to base the goals you can change around.

The Fundamental Question of Morality

The more I think about my last post, the more I think that "What should we do?" is the most fundamental question of morality. Should you kill one person to save five? Should you ever lie under any circumstance? It seems all moral dilemmas boil down to questions of action and decision.

But this alone doesn't really clarify matters much. It just pushes the ambiguity onto the word "should". What does it mean to say that you "should" do something?

Well, I came up with a partial answer here. As far as I can tell, for a "should" question to make sense, a goal is required. And I think in practice, whenever you make a decision, you do so for reasons, which can be described as goals.

But morality isn't just about how to achieve your goals. I think most people would say it's immoral for a sociopath to kill, even if that's his goal. In fact, I think most people would say it's immoral for someone to have such a goal.

So, maybe the most fundamental question of morality isn't "What should we do?" but rather, "What goals should we have?". But I just said "should" requires goals. How can you say what goals you should have without referring to goals? Is it even possible? If not, how can you answer the question?

Wait, What's This Morality Stuff Again?

It turns out that building meta-ethics from the ground up is somewhat difficult. So I'm going to take a step back, and explicitly describe some fundamental ideas about what morality is. Hopefully this will help point in the right direction to look.

Morality is about answering the question, "What should we do?"

This implies that morality is about willful actions. Morality doesn't apply to things that can't act, and can't make choices.

But morality isn't just about how to achieve your goals. It has more to do with what your goals should be.

Who is left unspecified. Usually, that's interpreted to mean that the answer should be universal, that it should apply to everyone in the same way. I'm not so sure about that. Maybe it just means the question needs more detail to have an answer.

However, morality does seem to be concerned with controlling others' actions. It's frequently used to justify doing something "bad" to someone else if they did something "bad" to you. But then again maybe that's a misapplication...

So, that's not a lot, but it's something. Maybe it will be helpful.

Hypothetical Imperatives

In my last few posts about morality, I've been pretty confident about my conclusions. From here on out, it will start getting more speculative. Some of my ideas may have merit, some may not. Please, tell me what you think about what I got right, and what should be changed.

In my last post, I asked how you could derive "ought" from "is". For a certain type of "ought" that's not hard at all. That type of "ought" that is a course of action to accomplish a given goal. For example, if  your goal is to lose weight, you ought to eat less fat. It is possible to empirically observe and test that to see if it effectively achieves the goal. This type of "ought" is called a hypothetical imperative and it's existence is the logical consequence of the existence of goals.

But is that the type of "ought" we're interested in? If we're talking about morality, shouldn't we be talking about something that's objective, and independent of individual goals?

One way of being independent of individual goals is to relate to all goals. If there were such a course of action, you would clearly want to follow it, because it would be a way to achieve your goals, regardless of what your goals are. But it's clear that there is no course of action to accomplish any goal. No matter what course of action you propose, you can come up with a goal counter to it. For example. you can't say that you should never steal to accomplish any goal, because that doesn't effectively achieve the goal of stealing.

Another way of being independent of individual goals is to not relate to goals at all. But in that case, why should you follow such a course of action? That approach seems to fall headlong back into the problem we're trying to answer. There's no apparent way to derive such an "ought" from an "is".

So are we back where we started? Unable to connect morality to reality? Well, not necessarily. We failed to find a special kind of "ought" that in independent on individual goals. But we did find the hypothetical imperative, which is a kind of "ought". Maybe it's the only "ought" we need. Maybe morality can be built entirely out of hypothetical imperatives. Again the question remains: How?

The Is-Ought Problem

In my last post, I asked what empirical observations you would be able to make that would be different if morality existed than if it did not. Some of you may have objected that that defies the is-ought problem.

Hume said that you can't derive "ought" statements from "is" statements alone. That is, you cannot determine what is moral or how the world should be just from how the world is. For example, suppose a runaway trolley is heading toward people who are tied to the track. There is a lever, which if pulled will divert the trolley onto another track, where it will cause no harm. Those facts alone are not enough to conclude that you ought to pull the lever. You can only conclude that if you add another "ought" statement to the premise, such as, "You ought to save lives.".

If Hume is correct, then morality is not observable in any way. Which would mean either that morality does not exist, or that morality is meaningless. Either way, it would be completely pointless to talk about morality.

So why are we talking about it? For that matter, why would anyone ever talk about it? No one ever talks about unobservable flergamarms, why would they talk about unobservable morality? Why would they even come up with the idea? Maybe people are just hopelessly confused. Or maybe Hume is wrong. Maybe ought can be derived from is. The question remains: How?

Does Morality Exist?

Does morality exist?

Well, what do you mean by morality? Keep in mind that an answer like "Morality is what is good." or "Morality is what is right." don't really answer the question. That just shoves the ambiguity onto another word. What you need is an explanation that breaks it down and really clarifies it.

If you're not sure how to answer that (and I'm not), the next thing to do is look at what you can observe. What empirical observations would you be able to make that would be different if morality did exist than if it did not?

So, what do you think?

Law and Morality

People sometimes claim, usually in the context of things like gay marriage or abortion, that you shouldn't legislate morality. Usually, this is in response to the claim that gay marriage (or abortion, or prostitution, or whatever the topic at hand is) is immoral, and therefore should be illegal. But that's a bad response, because morality should be legislated.

Opponents of abortion are actually pretty good about pointing out the foolishness of this stance, by comparing abortion to murder. No one would say "If you don't approve of murder, then don't murder people." or "I don't like murder, but if my neighbor does, who am I to judge?" The response to that is usually that it's ok to have laws against murder because murder hurts people.

But so what? Why is ok to make a law banning something that hurts people? Because hurting people is immoral.

I think the main reason this argument is compelling is that it's usually used against people who are arguing against something that's not immoral. People say, "I think gay sex is gross, therefore it's immoral, therefore it should be illegal!". The argument is clearly flawed, but the flaw isn't with the second "therefore", it's with the first.

The problem is not with saying that something immoral should be made illegal. The problem is with misidentifying what is moral in the first place.

So, what is morality? How do you correctly tell if something is moral or not? That's a topic for another post, or perhaps a book.

An Abortion Hypothetical

People opposed to the right to get an abortion like to make the argument that a fetus is alive, has a heartbeat, can feel pain, etc. It's obvious that these features are not sufficient to make the case. After all, cows have all those things, but the same people who complain about abortions don't usually have problems with eating meat.

But there's a related feature (well, more of a complex conglomeration of features) that isn't so obviously irrelevant. Is a fetus a person? That's a more reasonable question. But I still don't think it's relevant. Even if a fetus were undeniably a person, I'd still be in favor of the right to get an abortion. I'll illustrate with a hypothetical.

Suppose one winter's day, you accidentally leave your door unlocked. When you get home, you find that a homeless man has taken up residence. He doesn't pose any direct threat to you. He just takes up space, eats your food, and is generally inconvenient.

So, you decide to kick him out. "But", the homeless man protests, "It's freezing out there, and I have nowhere else to go! If you kick me out, I'll surely die!"

Is it morally prohibited to kick him out? Should you be required to provide him with food and shelter?

Now obviously, this hypothetical has a lot of differences from abortion. Here are the two I find most important.

One, homeless man is most definitely a person. A fetus may have a heartbeat, but this guy can talk. In the case of abortion, the status of the fetus is, at best, ambiguous.

Two, the homeless man is only taking shelter in your house, not your body. If you're allowed to decide who may or may not be in your property, surely you should be allowed to decide who may or may not be in your body.

And that's the important point of the abortion debate. It's not whether or not the fetus is a person. It's about whether women have the right to control their own bodies.

Moral Intuition

We usually judge moral theories with our intuition. We see what a moral theory says about a hypothetical scenario and see if that agrees with our intuition. People arguing for a particular moral theory frequently give examples of situations in which that moral theory gives an answer that most people's intuitions agree with. People arguing against a particular moral theory frequently give examples of situations in which that moral theory gives an answer the most people's intuitions disagree with.

But a lot of times the examples used are very unlikely situations. That's not a problem for the moral theory. A good moral theory should work in any situation, likely or unlikely. But it is a problem for our intuition.

Intuition is only useful in circumstances it evolved in.

Consider physics. Humans have pretty good intuition with regards to running, jumping, throwing and other things we've been doing for millions of years. But outside our relatively limited experience, our intuition is virtually useless. There's nothing intuitive about general relativity or quantum mechanics.

Which is why I don't think hypothetical problems like the Trolley Problem are useful in determining what makes a good moral theory (though they can be useful in helping us examine our intuitions). Because such hypothetical scenarios rarely reflect our normal experience, so our intuitions don't necessarily apply.

So then, the question is, if we can't trust our moral intuition, then how should we judge a moral theory?

How Can You Be Moral Without God?

Some theists claim that god is needed for morality. They ask, "How can you be moral without God?"

They might as well ask "How can you be moral with God?" Or better yet, "How can you be moral?", or "What is morality?"

I don't claim to have the answers to those questions. Philosophers have been debating that for thousands of years, and have come up with many contradictory answers, so most of them have to have been wrong.

But bringing god into the question doesn't make it any better. If you say that god's commands are good, you run into the Euthyphro dilemma. Does god command what is good because it is good, or is what is good good, because god commands it?

If the answer is the former, then we're back where we started. If god doesn't determine what's good, then what does?

The alternative has some implications that don't agree with what most people would consider morality. For example, god could change what is moral on a whim, and it wouldn't be wrong. After all, if god determines morality, and it said "It's moral for me to change the laws of morality", well, it couldn't be wrong, now could it?

And consider this analogy (adapted from this). Suppose aliens came to Earth, with overwhelming technological powers. It's impossible for us to fight them, they just vaporize our weapons as soon as we try to use them. And they impose on us some rules that seem quite arbitrary. For example, no one is allowed to wear blue shirts on Tuesday. They reward people who follow their rules, and punish people who don't. Further suppose, that after some time, they eventually leave. Which do you think would be the more common reaction to their departure? "But who will stop us from wearing blue shirts on Tuesdays?" or "Thank god those terrible aliens are gone!"

If what is good is determined solely by god, then his commands would appear to us to be arbitrary. We wouldn't consider a command against murder any more important than a command against blue shirts, and we wouldn't be worried that god is needed to give such a command.

But You Did Not Persuade Me

For the most part, I don't disagree with Jeff Atwood's most recent post. On a factual level, he's correct. When coding, it's more important to market than to code. In fact, for anything you want to do, from plumbing to politics, it's more important to convince people that you do a good job than to do a good job.

But that's not a good thing. Everyone shouldn't have to be a marketer. Specialization is a powerful thing, and it'd be nice if that could be applied to marketing too.

I don't know how or even if such a change is possible. And I'll admit I'm biased by my sub-par social skills. But it still seems like something to strive for.

Also, I disagree with his interpretation of that scene. The unavoidable truth it exposes is that Idi Aman is crazy and incapable of recognizing good advice.

The Death Penalty

Yesterday, two people were executed. One was probably guilty. One was maybe not. But even if they were guilty, is justice served by execution?

I say no. Killing is a bad thing. Regardless of who dies, death is bad. Killing may sometimes be the lesser of two evils (for example, self defense), but that doesn't make it good. Another solution that didn't involve death would be better.

Moreover, killing accomplishes very little. The victims of a murderer aren't brought back to life by his execution. It doesn't undo the damage that's been wrong. The only positive things I can think of are that it prevents the criminal from committing future crimes, which can be done through other means, and that it gives the survivors revenge-inspired happiness, which isn't really something that should be encouraged, in my book.

Two wrongs don't make a right. Justice isn't achieved by hurting someone who hurt you. Justice is achieved by healing hurt and righting past wrongs. Sometimes that's not possible, but that doesn't make vengeance right.

The Problem with The Bible as a Moral Guide

Well, one of them, anyway. The problem with using The Bible as a moral guide is that it can be, and has been, used to support pretty much everything.

The bible has been used to support slavery. It's also been used to oppose it. It's been used to show that premarital sex is evil, and also to show that it's alright. It's been used to support women's rights and oppose them. People have used it to argue for and against gay marriage. People have even made biblical arguments for and against environmentalism. The only thing I can think of that the bible has only been used to support one side of is bestiality. That's not saying a lot.

How are you supposed to find out what's right when the Bible supports and opposes whatever you want resolved?


This video makes about the same points from around 11:00 to 11:50. It also makes many other good points.

The Problem of Evil

A lot of Christians claim that God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good. And yet, earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes, floods, fires and all sorts of other natural disasters happen everyday which destroy infrastructure and kill people.

I'll let a Greek philosopher (probably not actually Epicurus, though usually attributed to him) make the connection.

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

One of the most common solutions to the problem of evil is to say God has "mysterious ways" and these acts serve some greater purpose. But God is supposed to be omnipotent. Not just really, really powerful - all-powerful. If he were all-powerful, he could achieve the same purposes without the killing and destruction.

Some people say that God can't be morally judged the same as humans, but I don't see why not. Whether something is moral or not isn't determined by the actor's power or knowledge. (Note to self: write a post going into more detail about this.)

One of the most... interesting... solutions to this problem that I've seen is that natural disasters are caused by human evil and sinfulness and for God to prevent them would interfere with our freewill. Of course, there was no explanation of how humans cause natural disasters, or how God would be interfering with freewill by eliminating them.

And then of course, there is the solution that there is no such entity that is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Personally, I find that to be the most parsimonious solution.

On Liberals and Conservatives

Have you ever heard of TED? There are lots of cool, thought-provoking talks. To the point, this (follow the link for a transcript).



Jonathan Haidt talks about the different foundations of liberal and conservative morals. Everyone's morality is based on five different foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Liberals mainly consider harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, but not the other three. Conservatives consider all five approximately equally.

He didn't say exactly how he determined these things, so maybe the studies involved were biased or something, and this is actually inaccurate. But in my experience, this seems mostly accurate. I know I care far more about the liberal foundations than the conservative foundations. Most of the people I know too. And when it comes to actual political policies, it seems that way too. Liberals support gay marriage for equality. Conservatives oppose it for authority.

But Haidt continues that building and maintaining social order requires all five foundations. The first time I listened to the speech, I didn't believe him. But as I've thought about it more, I've come to think that maybe he's right. Or at least, not totally wrong. I still disagree with purity/sanctity, I don't see the point of it. But in-group/loyalty and authority/respect, while they might not be strictly necessary, they are definitely helpful. In particular, the authority bit.

Consider a country with a strong, powerful leader, compared to one with a weak, impotent leader. The former country will be able to do things, and get things done. The latter country won't. Large groups of people need to be organized in order to acheive anything, and people just aren't good at self-organizing. A strong authority and group loyalty help them do that.

Then the question is which authority. Not all authority is good. Stalin was a strong authority and maintained a social order, but his authority isn't exactly desirable. So, you can't just point to authority to determine morality. But neither can you simply switch your desired authority at a whim, since that's the same as having no authority at all.

It's a tricky thing. You can't question all authority, nor can you question none. Like all things in life, it's a balance thing. Question authority when it is necessary, and respect it when it is necessary.